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IMPERFECT TAKINGS 
Shai Stern* 
ABSTRACT 
Three concerns are inherent to the power of eminent domain — 
when a government forcibly takes away private property to provide a 
social good: abuse of this power, unfair distribution of burdens among 
members of society, and inefficient implementation of the 
government project.  To protect against these undesirable outcomes, 
expropriation laws in most Western jurisdictions incorporate three 
safeguards: due process, a public use requirement, and mandatory 
compensation.  While jurisdictions implement these safeguards in 
different ways, most demand their implementation as a prerequisite 
for legitimate expropriation.  Arguably, the purpose of allowing 
governments to expropriate private property is to provide for 
important societal needs.  But this conflicts with the idea that the 
government ought to perfectly adhere to the three aforementioned 
safeguards at all times.  Imperfect circumstances, such as times of 
crisis, likely require governments to provide for the needs of their 
citizens, but afford insufficient time for standard due process.  
Imperfect implementation of the three safeguards may also be 
necessary when authorities struggle with budgetary limitations that 
prevent full compensation, or when they are unable to meet a social 
need without the involvement of private entities.  In all these 
imperfect circumstances, at least one of the safeguards might be 
compromised if the government is to provide required social needs 
through expropriation. 
This Article proposes a novel model to conceptualize eminent 
domain, which identifies an interplay among expropriation laws’ three 
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Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Yifat Holzman Gazit, Tsilly Dagan, Avital Margalit, Manal 
Totry Jubran, and others for their perspective, comments, and suggestions on earlier 
drafts. 
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safeguards.  It further recognizes that each of these safeguards 
protects, to some extent, against all three of the potential dangers 
inherent in government’s expropriation power.  This innovative 
interplay model legitimizes compromise, such that it is appropriate 
for there to be only partial implementation of one safeguard as long 
as the other two are strictly applied.  The interplay model proposed in 
this Article, therefore, allows the government to exercise its 
expropriation power properly even in imperfect circumstances, while 
still sufficiently protecting property owners and society from abuse of 
that power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Takings law, the power of the government to acquire property 
from unwilling property owners to further its citizens’ needs and 
interests, is well-rooted in American property jurisprudence.1  
Through this power, the government aims to overcome obstacles 
threatening its ability to fulfill the essential needs of its citizens, such 
as sidewalks, roads, educational institutions, medical institutions, and 
workplaces.  These essential needs of society often require the 
purchase of land for their implementation.  For example, if the 
government aims to build a new highway, it must purchase the land 
on which the highway is to be built.  Clearly, it is desirable to realize 
these essential goals in an agreed upon manner, through voluntary 
acquisition of the land from the owners.  However, there are 
 
 1. For a comprehensive review of the role of eminent domain in American 
property jurisprudence, see William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent 
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972); Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private Use, 
and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409 
(1983). See also RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 35–37 (1985). 
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situations where such a voluntary acquisition is not possible.  One of 
the main obstacles governments face in providing for society’s needs 
is market imperfection.  Market failures, such as holdouts and free 
riders, may prevent the government from purchasing land voluntarily 
and may therefore threaten government’s ability to meet society’s 
needs.2  The government’s power to forcefully take private property, 
therefore, is considered an essential instrument that allows it to 
realize its underlying purpose— fulfilling society’s needs.3 
However, while this power can be useful to the government in 
overcoming obstacles that may prevent it from meeting the needs of 
its citizens, its use raises three primary concerns.  First is corruption: 
the government might improperly use its power to take private 
property even when there is no justification for doing so.  Second is 
fairness: government taking of private property raises concerns about 
the fair allocation of burdens among society members, particularly 
where one property owner is forced to sacrifice for the benefit of the 
community.  This concern raises questions about the scope and scale 
of the obligations that owners have toward their communities4 and 
 
 2. The most prominent market failure discussed in the literature, known as the 
“holdout” problem, relates to the transactional costs that arise when multiple land 
parcels are required to facilitate the implementation of the public need; most agree 
that one party prevents or delays this implementation by delaying the voluntary 
purchase. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 509, 606 (1986); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–41 (2d 
ed. 1970); Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. 
ECON. 473 (1976); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of 
Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006) (“The primary objection to 
substantive limits on the eminent domain power is that holdouts may impede socially 
beneficial projects.”); cf. Bruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as a 
Justification for Eminent Domain and Public Provision of Roads, 10 INDEP. REV. 165, 
166 (2005).  While market failures are considered the prominent justification for 
government takings power, both the literature and case law suggest another 
justification based on distributive justice and the government’s commitment to ensure 
equality. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding the 
constitutionality of land-reform measures that target oligopolistic owners and 
redistribute some of their land titles as falling within the takings clause); see generally 
Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999); Jeffrey 
M. Gaba, Taking Justice and Fairness Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings 
Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 
459 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1981) (quoting Justice Cooley in People ex rel. Detroit Howell 
R.R. Co. v. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 480–82 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1870), who said, 
“the most important consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of 
accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable . . . ”) overruled by 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2004) (overruling 
Poletown Neighborhood Council on other grounds). 
 4. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of 
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, The 
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the fairness of forced reallocation of burdens when the beneficiaries 
include other individuals.  Third is inefficiency: the government’s use 
of its takings power — which, because of its coercive nature, operates 
outside the boundaries of the free market — raises concerns about 
potential inefficiencies involved in realizing the public need.  
Specifically, use of the takings power raises two fundamental 
questions: Whether the government will be able to internalize the 
social costs involved in realizing the public project for which the 
property was taken, and how the investment policy of current and 
prospective landowners will be affected.5 
These concerns shape current takings law, which aims to address 
each of these issues by incorporating three safeguards.  First is a 
procedural safeguard, manifested by the government’s duty to 
provide owners with due process to reduce concerns of governmental 
misuse of takings power.6  Second is the fairness safeguard, which 
requires that the taken property be used only for public needs; this 
sketches the boundaries of owners’ obligations to their communities 
and prevents governments from using their takings power to 
improperly redistribute property among private individuals.  Third is 
the efficiency safeguard, actualized by the duty of the government to 
compensate owners for the taken property,7 which prevents 
ineffectiveness in the execution of the public project for which the 
property was taken.  These three safeguards provide triangular 
protection against the three inherent concerns that arise from the 
government’s takings power.  However, what happens when none of 
these safeguards can be fully realized?  Can governments use their 
takings power to confiscate private property even when doing so 
might compromise due process, the publicness of the use, or just 
compensation?  If so, under what circumstances can such a 
compromise be legitimized? 
This Article contends that takings law cannot be blind to imperfect 
circumstances.  Emergencies, crises, and budgetary limitations are an 
undeniable part of everyday reality, and ignoring them may result in 
situations where the underlying good that governmental taking can 
promote is overshadowed by the harms that arise in such imperfect 
 
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2008); 
Hanoch Dagan, Property and the Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 84 (2006); 
Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, 
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 17–22. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 24–28. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
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circumstances.  By the same token, insisting on the full realization of 
all the safeguards implicated by takings law, regardless of the 
circumstances, may harm the government’s ability to make use of its 
power, leaving society’s needs unfulfilled. 
This Article demonstrates that, although each of the safeguards in 
takings law provides protection against a particular concern, each one 
simultaneously provides ancillary protection against the other two 
concerns as well.  In this sense, each of the three safeguards 
incorporated in takings law protects against each of the three 
concerns inherent in confiscation of private property.  These 
overlapping protections provided by the safeguards allow for an 
interplay between them.  Governments can ease the implementation 
of one safeguard as circumstances require, while still maintaining an 
adequate level of protection against all three inherent concerns.  This 
interplay between takings law’s safeguards reduces the need for all 
safeguards to be fully implemented in every circumstance — even 
when one of the safeguards is not fully implemented, it is still possible 
to provide adequate protection against the concern it was originally 
intended to assuage.  Indeed, since each safeguard protects against all 
three of takings law’s inherent concerns to some degree, even if the 
government compromises on one of the safeguards, the interplay 
identified here will still provide proper protection against all three 
concerns.  Another important aspect of the interplay model is the 
application of safeguards in a nonbinary manner, such that each of 
the safeguards can be applied in several different ways.  At bottom, 
by recognizing and implementing this flexible interplay model, 
decision-makers, legislators, and courts have a predictable framework 
for adjusting takings law to imperfect circumstances. 
With these insights in mind, any compromise on takings law’s 
safeguards must be contingent on two conditions.  First, only one of 
the safeguards can be compromised at any given time, and even then, 
the safeguard cannot be completely relinquished.  This means that 
even though imperfect circumstances may require a softening in the 
realization of one of the safeguards, they can never serve as an excuse 
for governments to ignore or waive that safeguard completely.  
Second, when one of the safeguards must be compromised, and so is 
only partially realized, the other two safeguards should be 
implemented in a stricter manner. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses in detail the 
concerns inherent to governments’ use of takings power: 
governmental abuse of its power, unfair distribution of burdens, and 
inefficiency in the project’s implementation.  Part II demonstrates 
how takings law incorporated three safeguards to address these 
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concerns.  The procedural safeguard (through the requirement of due 
process) is meant to mitigate against governmental corruption; the 
fairness safeguard, by requiring that expropriation be done only for 
public use, is meant to ensure a fair distribution of burdens; and the 
efficiency safeguard, through the compensation requirement, aims to 
ensure economic efficiency in the exchange being facilitated.  Part III 
identifies the interplay between takings law’s three safeguards, which 
is based in the recognition that although each of them provides 
primary protection against a certain concern, they all provide 
secondary protection from the other two as well.  This Part continues 
to discuss the implications of the interplay model, which provides a 
platform for legitimate takings even in imperfect circumstances.  Part 
IV shifts the proposed interplay model from theory to practice and 
provides an explanation of takings jurisprudence that seemingly 
stands at odds with current takings law.  This allows a rethinking of 
old conventions in takings jurisprudence. 
I. THE POWER TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY: IMPORTANCE AND 
INHERENT CONCERNS 
Many governments possess the power to acquire property from 
unwilling property owners to further the general welfare.  This power, 
which interferes with owners’ property rights, is legitimate in most 
Western legal jurisdictions and is often used by governments to 
overcome market failures that prevent the efficient implementation 
of public needs.8  Compulsory acquisition of private property, 
however, also gives rise to concerns that are inherent in governmental 
actions that take a coercive form.  Three such inherent concerns have 
shaped current takings law: governmental abuse of power, unfair 
distribution of burdens, and inefficiency. 
One of the fundamental premises underlying governmental 
expropriation powers is that a government will likely encounter 
difficulties when attempting to provide various social needs to its 
citizens.  Some of the most significant challenges include, for example, 
 
 8. On the power of eminent domain in the American legal system, see JESSE 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 895–996 (2006).  On the history of eminent domain 
in the United States, or its equivalents in other countries, see NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 1.1 (2006).  For a comprehensive review of how constitutions in different 
jurisdictions address expropriation of private property, see A.J. VAN DER WALT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999).  For a 
comparison of constitutional treatment of expropriation in the United States, 
Germany, and South Africa, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE 
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS 
JURISPRUDENCE (2006). 
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the supply of public goods, or overcoming inherent market failures 
such as holdouts and free riders.9  However important the takings 
power is to governments, it must be carefully exercised and executed 
— indeed, governments’ ability to expropriate private property raises 
a familiar concern: that corruption, greed, or inattentiveness might 
lead to misuse of this power.10  That is, authorities who can legally 
take property through coercion might use this power when the 
property ought to have been bought in the free market.11  If 
unchecked, the governmental takings power might be abused to 
convey property to those close to power or to achieve hidden goals.12 
Compulsory acquisition of property rights by governmental 
authorities raises additional concerns relating to fairness.13  While the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution allows the 
federal government to take private property in order to provide for 
public needs, exercising this power raises two distributive 
 
 9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public 
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82 (1986); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The 
Holdout Problem, Urban Sprawl, and Eminent Domain, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 309 
(2007). 
 10. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 509, 605 (1986) (“Concerns about abuse of power are potentially far 
more important in the context of takings than in most other transition contexts 
precisely because takings often single out individuals or groups . . . .”). 
 11. See, e.g., Michael A. Lang, Taking Back Eminent Domain: Using Heightened 
Scrutiny to Stop Eminent Domain Abuse, 39 IND. L. REV. 449, 453–54, 467 (2006); 
Jeffrey W. Scott, Public Use and Private Profit: When Should Heightened Scrutiny 
Be Applied to “Public-Private” Takings?, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 466, 473–74 (2003). 
 12. See, e.g., DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN IN 
THE POST-KELO WORLD 7 (2006), 
http://castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgates-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JL8Q-738X] (documenting over 5,000 actual or threatened cases of 
private takings between June 2005 and June 2006); DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, 
PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ED_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7RW5-WHVN] (documenting over 10,000 actual or threatened 
cases of private takings from 1998 through 2002 and demonstrating how takings often 
abuse poor neighborhoods and elderly residents); see generally Martin E. Gold & 
Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight in Eminent Domain, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1119 (2010). 
 13. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.”). 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 137 
difficulties.14  First, should a private owner bear the burden of 
providing for the needs of society?  Second, what is the scope and 
scale of the public need that justifies using takings power?  Both 
questions relate to the notion of fairness in the exercise of power by 
government in different ways.  As Justice Chase outlined as early as 
1798 in Calder v. Bull, neither reason nor justice may justify the 
government’s ability to take property from “A” and give it to “B.”15  
Over two hundred years later, courts and scholars still struggle with 
questions of fairness relating to coercive state powers and the taking 
of private property.16 
The final concern is that governments exercising their compulsory 
acquisition powers might ignore efficiency considerations as they 
execute the public project.17  This criticism mainly stems from the fact 
that compulsory takings circumvent free market mechanisms, 
highlighting the lack of efficient economic frameworks for 
government expropriation.  The government’s actions will ultimately 
be inefficient if it disregards the inherent value of the property when 
it calculates the economic efficiency of fulfilling the public need.18  
Prevalent in the commentary on this topic is the assertion that the 
government might be caught up in a “fiscal illusion” that will cause it 
to disregard the value of the taken property when calculating the 
project’s costs.19  According to the “fiscal illusion” argument, 
governments ignore costs that are not reflected in the budget of the 
 
 14. Id.; see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 
741, 742–43 (1999). 
 15. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387–88 (1798). 
 16. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Charles E. 
Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for 
Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2005); 
Eric L. Silkwood, The Downlow on Kelo: How an Expansive Interpretation of the 
Public Use Clause Has Opened the Floodgates for Eminent Domain Abuse, 109 W. 
VA. L. REV. 493 (2006); ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW 
LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in 
the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1001 (1999) (“[T]o relieve the 
government of any obligation to pay is to forgo an opportunity to test whether the 
benefits of a government program are truly worth its costs, an important matter when 
the benefit-cost call is a close one.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (4th ed. 1992) (“A 
straight forward economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is 
that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power.”). 
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project itself.20  Government officials who suffer from the fiscal 
illusion will tend to engage in inefficient exercises of eminent domain, 
since they only see the public benefit of takings while ignoring the 
cost to the property owners.21  On the other side of the takings 
equation, property owners’ investment policies might be distorted 
because of concerns about future governmental takings of their land, 
leading to an inefficient process.22 
These three concerns are inherent in government’s compulsory 
acquisition of property.  They stem from the forced nature of the 
government’s action and its execution outside the margins of the free 
market, as well as from the intrinsic characteristics of governmental 
action and the relationship between the government and those close 
to power.23  In most Western jurisdictions, governmental takings law 
has aimed to address these inherent concerns by incorporating three 
legal safeguards against coercive acquisition. 
II. THE TRIANGULAR SAFEGUARD MECHANISM OF TAKINGS LAW 
To address the three inherent concerns of governmental 
expropriation of private property, takings law incorporates three 
safeguards.  The first safeguard — termed the “procedural safeguard” 
— binds takings power with the demands of due process.  The Fifth 
Amendment specifically states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”24  Taken 
together with the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law[,]”25 the Constitution affords property owners the 
right to due process in both federal and state government 
confiscations.26  The scope and scale of these procedures, however, 
 
 20. See Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government 
Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation 
Requirement on Eminent-Domain Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 438 (2016). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation 
Be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71, 72 (1984). 
 23. On the concern that governments will execute coercive acquisition to the 
benefit of those close to power, see, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 17, at 1001 (“If 
compensation were not required, politicians would be inclined to support 
government projects that benefit the privileged at the expense of the vulnerable.”). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
 26. See D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 
1282–83 (2010). 
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vary from state to state.27  Governments’ power to take private 
property is conditioned upon providing owners with due process to 
reduce the concern of governmental abuse.28  When owners are 
informed about expected expropriation and receive an opportunity to 
express their protest, the likelihood of state abuse of power decreases. 
Another safeguard incorporated into takings law, the “fairness 
safeguard,” refers to the requirement that expropriated property be 
taken only for public use.  The demand that the governmental taking 
be for a “public use,”29 “public need,” or “public interest” has been 
implemented in most Western governmental takings laws.30  In 
whatever scope or scale, this requirement clarifies that government 
may forcibly take private property only when necessary to fulfill the 
individual’s obligations to society as a whole.  Indeed, neither reason 
nor justice can justify unfairly taking one’s property and giving it to 
another.31  It is the owners’ social obligation that legitimizes the 
government’s power to interfere with private property in the first 
place.32  There will inevitably be varying interpretations of what 
constitutes a “public” government objective, but there remains no 
dispute that the justification for takings must begin with the 
individual’s obligation to society.33  Therefore, the “publicness” of the 
goal for taking one’s property is intended to protect against a 
 
 27. For a comprehensive summary of due process in takings proceeding in 
different states, see id. at 1321–27.  D. Zachary Hudson demonstrates how both state 
and federal courts embrace the importance of due process as a precondition to 
governmental intervention in one’s property rights. Id. 
 28. For the argument that due process protects against governmental abuse of 
power, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”); 
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the 
Court Taken the Substance out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
313 (1991).  For the implications of this argument in takings law, see Hudson, supra 
note 26, at 1287. 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 30. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW ART. 14.3], translation 
at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-470510 
[https://perma.cc/9FSH-K3DF] (“public interest”); Land (Acquisition for Public 
Purposes) Ordinance §§ 2, 7 (1943) (“acquisition for public needs”); S. AFR. CONST. § 
25, 1996 (“public purpose or public interest”). 
 31. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387–88 (1798). 
 32. Alexander, supra note 4, at 776 (“Eminent domain is a legal and political 
process for determining just what that responsibility is.  At its most general level, the 
power of eminent domain represents our collective judgment that the state is justified 
in demanding of us, as members of the political and social community that nurtures 
us as flourishing individuals, under certain conditions, the sacrifice of title to our land 
in exchange for just compensation, measured at fair market value.”). 
 33. Id. at 776–77. 
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governmental taking that exceeds the individual’s obligations to 
society.34  This requirement sketches the bounds of what should and 
should not be considered a “fair” and legitimate burden imposed on 
individual property owners.  The “fairness safeguard,” therefore, is 
designed primarily to prevent the government from taking private 
property in a manner that unfairly distributes burdens in society. 
The third safeguard incorporated in takings law in most Western 
jurisdictions is mandatory compensation.35  The requirement that 
owners be compensated when their property is coercively taken is 
mainly intended to ensure economically efficient execution of the 
purpose for which the land was expropriated.36  However, because 
governmental taking is compulsory, it operates outside the 
boundaries of the free market.  This disconnect gives rise to a concern 
about inefficiency in the implementing procedures of the public 
project, which is expressed in two ways.  First, in the form of a fiscal 
illusion: government officials might engage in inefficient exercises of 
eminent domain, because they are likely to see only the public benefit 
of takings while ignoring the cost to the owners.37  If not required to 
compensate owners, the expropriating authorities might disregard the 
property’s value when calculating the overall costs of the acquisition 
itself.38  This fiscal illusion disrupts the economic calculus by which 
the government executes the taking and is therefore likely to damage 
its efficiency.39  Second, the compensation, or lack thereof, also 
affects property owners’ attitudes towards investing in their land.40  
Lack of compensation or partial compensation may lead owners to 
adopt an under-investment policy to avoid financial loss in case their 
 
 34. Id. at 777 (“The fact that the power of eminent domain is collective creates an 
obvious risk of abuse.  The political community is justified in demanding this 
entitlement sacrifice only to the extent that the demand represents a bona fide 
determination of what is in the community’s best interests by a legitimate 
representative expression of that community.”). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 36. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1173 (1967). 
 37. See Levine-Schnur & Parchomovsky, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 38. THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 141 (1997); POSNER, supra note 
19, at 58 (“The simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just 
compensation is that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power.”); 
John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 
794 (2006); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on 
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1297 (1985). 
 39. See Heller & Krier, supra note 17, at 1001. 
 40. See Blume et al., supra note 22, at 71, 72, 82. 
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property is taken by the government.41  If the government elects to 
use a non-compensation or a partial compensation policy, owners 
may decide not to develop or invest in their property because they 
fear that if their property is expropriated, they will not be fully 
compensated for these investments.  Contrarily, full compensation 
may lead owners to adopt an attitude of over-investment that will 
burden the whole of society to finance the owners’ idiosyncratic 
investments.42  That is to say, if government is too quick to 
compensate, owners may disregard economically desired level of 
investment as they assume they would be compensated fully for any 
investment in the property.  These impacts on owners’ investment 
choices have a bearing on aggregate welfare.  They also affect the 
efficiency of governmental takings, as they skew the price tag that the 
government will have to pay to accomplish the public need.43 
These three safeguards, all incorporated in American takings law 
as well as in most other Western jurisdictions’ expropriation laws, 
provide threefold protection against the concerns that are inherent in 
compulsory taking of property.  It is important to recognize, however, 
that each safeguard is implemented on a continuum that moves from 
a low measure of protection to a high one. 
The “procedural safeguard,” for example, calls for transparent and 
participatory procedures that give landowners a platform for 
expression and hearing rights.  To achieve this result, various 
jurisdictions demand the existence of numerous and diverse 
procedures, such as mandatory notification to owners before the 
taking begins,44 first offer to and negotiation with owners,45 
 
 41. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, 
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973) (“If a person 
feels that the market undervalues his damage, he may be unusually sensitive and the 
best cost avoider of the losses resulting from that hypersensitivity.”).  See also Blume 
et al., supra note 22 at 71, 72, 82 (discussing the effect of compensation rules on 
owners’ future investment decisions). 
 42. See Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium 
in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 622 (2013) (discussing the implications 
of the compensation on the owner’s investment policy); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 882 (2007) 
(arguing that full compensation creates “a moral hazard problem” since “full 
recompense distorts property owners’ incentives”). 
 43. See Ellickson, supra note 41, at 736. 
 44. For a comprehensive review of due process procedures in different states in 
the United States, see Hudson, supra note 26, at 1322–27.  For a comprehensive 
review about the procedural requirement in expropriation proceedings in Europe, 
see EXPROPRIATION LAW IN EUROPE (Jacques Sluysmans et al. eds., 2015). 
 45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 18-1A-22, 18-1A-24, 18-1A-74 (LexisNexis 2007); 
IDAHO CODE ANN.  
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mandatory hearings and the provision of information,46 and 
transparent procedures that are subject to public and judicial 
review.47  But procedural protection in eminent domain proceedings 
are not standardized — each state may require some procedures and 
not require others.48  These differences among jurisdictions regarding 
the scope and scale of procedural requirements display a continuum 
of implementation, from the bare minimum requirements to heavy 
and elaborate procedural protections. 
The “fairness safeguard” is implemented on a spectrum with 
respect to the “publicness” of the project for which the property is 
taken.  At one end are so-called “hard” public objectives — those that 
directly relate to providing essential services such as transportation, 
health, and education.49  At the other end are “soft” public objectives 
achieved by private entities, which only indirectly lead to increased 
public welfare.  A notable example of a “soft” public objective is seen 
in Kelo v. City of New London, a case decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in 2005.50  In Kelo, the City of New London, 
Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private 
property to sell to private developers.51  The City’s justification was 
that developing the land would create jobs and increase tax 
revenues.52  The Court concluded that the City’s compulsory taking, 
in order to sell the property for private development, qualified as a 
“public use” within the meaning of the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.53  While this ruling provoked both legal and public 
 
§§ 7-706 to 7-710 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-24-1-3 to 32-24-1-16 
(LexisNexis 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 6B.1 to 6B.3 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 70-30-111, 70-30-202 (West 2009) and N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-15-06.1 (West 
2017). 
 46. See Hudson, supra note 26, at 1322–27. 
 47. Id. 
 48. For example, while both Alabama and Kansas provide owners with due 
process in takings procedures, Alabama law requires prior offer and negotiation, full 
pre-condemnation hearing, and notice, while Kansas law requires full pre-
condemnation hearing and notice but does not condition the taking on the authority’s 
prior offer and negotiation with owners. See ALA. CODE §§ 18-1A-22, 18-1A-24, 18-
1A-74 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501 to 26-517 (2000). 
 49. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) 
(confiscation for military base); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 
707–08 (1923) (confiscation for highways). 
 50. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 51. Id. at 473–74. 
 52. Id. at 469–70. 
 53. The case will be explained in depth infra Section IV.A. 
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backlash,54 the holding sketches how wide the boundaries are for 
“publicness” in expropriations. 
The “efficiency safeguard” exists on a continuum relating to the 
rate of compensation that should be paid — or, put another way, the 
type of remedy that should be afforded — to owners.  In general, 
American takings law, like most Western jurisdictions, embraces a 
compensation standard based on the fair market value of the taken 
property.55  Nevertheless, some states supplemented this universal 
standard with compensation for loss of goodwill or with relocation 
assistance.  Additionally, after the Kelo ruling some states amended 
their takings law, requiring authorities to pay up to 200% of the taken 
property’s market value in takings meant for economic 
development.56  Therefore, while the fair market value of the 
property serves as the universal compensation standard, it might be 
amended to provide additional compensation. 
In summary, the three safeguards incorporated in governmental 
takings law are intended to protect against the realization of the 
concerns surrounding coercive government power and its 
accompanying implications. These safeguards attempt to ensure that 
the government’s power to forcibly take private property is exercised 
in a proper, fair, and efficient way.  Nevertheless, as discussed below, 
setting a high bar for the implementation of all the protective 
mechanisms simultaneously might, at times, defeat the basic and 
much-needed purpose of takings power itself. 
 
 54. For a review of the post-Kelo political and public backlash, see generally 
SOMIN, supra note 16, at 135–64. 
 55. This rule is subject to two narrow and seldom applied exceptions: fair market 
value does not apply where it would be too difficult to measure or where manifest 
injustice would result. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 
123 (1950).  For a comprehensive review of the American ruling on this issue, see 
generally Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation 
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2004). 
 56. In response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo, several 
states made changes to their expropriation laws to determine the rate of 
compensation at above market value. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. X, §2 (amended 
2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-127(b)(6)(D), 8-193(b)(1) (2010); S.B. 167, 2007 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (requiring payment of “not less than 125 percent of that 
property’s fair market value, in addition to any other reimbursement allowed by 
law”). See also H.B. 1010, Leg. (Ind. 2006) (requiring payment of compensation when 
the condemned property is the person’s primary residence at a rate equal to 150 
percent of fair market value); S.B. 323, Leg. (Kan. 2006) (increasing the level of 
compensation to landowners whose property is condemned for private economic 
development purposes to 200 percent of the average appraised value of the 
property). 
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III. IMPERFECT TAKINGS: A NON-UTOPIAN MODEL FOR TAKINGS 
LAW 
Takings law incorporates three safeguards to protect against the 
concerns inherent in governments’ takings powers, but the full 
execution of these protections can often be challenging.  Consider, for 
example, times of crisis.  In cases of emergency, authorities might 
need to take certain lands without abiding by all the procedures that 
apply to compulsory acquisition under normal conditions.  In other 
cases, private entities might have to be involved to fully realize the 
purpose of the governmental taking.  Or the government might need 
to supply services and products to society but have insufficient 
resources to fully compensate owners for the value of the taken 
property.  These “imperfect” situations complicate the equation: Is 
expropriation of private property justified only with complete 
implementation of the three safeguards?  Or are there situations 
where implementation can be relaxed? 
This Part of the Article contends that the original rationale for 
incorporating the three safeguards into takings law also justifies, in 
certain cases, easing their implementation.  As mentioned above, 
underlying the three safeguards is the desire to ensure that 
expropriation of private property is done ethically, fairly, and with 
economic efficiency.57  However, it is important not to lose sight of 
the fact that the overarching purpose of takings law is to enable the 
government to provide essential needs to its citizens.  Setting too high 
a bar that demands strict and rigid implementation of the three 
safeguards will likely hinder the government’s ability to accomplish 
that purpose and weaken a fundamental assumption that underlies 
the incorporation of the safeguards in expropriation law: that there 
should be a balance between the government’s duty to meet society’s 
essential needs and the execution of this duty in a suitable way. 
To achieve this balance, governments must understand the specific 
protections that each of the safeguards provides.  As mentioned 
above, each safeguard protects directly against one of the three 
concerns inherent in the governmental takings power.  But each 
safeguard reaches beyond this reason for being; that is, each also 
protects, in differing degrees, against the evils that the other two 
safeguards are intended to mitigate. 
The procedural safeguard protects primarily against corruption — 
governmental abuse of its power to take private property.  Indeed, 
 
 57. See supra Part II. 
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the implementation of regulated and transparent takings procedures, 
such as the duty to consult with experts or to hold mandatory 
hearings, reduces the possibility that governments will expropriate 
private property without restraint.58  But these procedures also 
protect against unfair execution of governmental expropriation.  
Well-known, transparent, and participatory public procedures ensure 
that authorities maintain a balance between providing societal needs 
through compulsory acquisition while considering the burdens placed 
on individuals losing property.  The likelihood that burdens will be 
imposed in an unbalanced manner decreases when authorities have to 
justify their takings, and, no less importantly, when these takings are 
overt and exposed to public or legal review.  Adherence to such 
procedures also makes inefficiency in executing governmental takings 
less likely.  Through structured takings procedures, the government 
and the property owner can reveal to each other the costs that will be 
involved in executing the taking.  As mentioned previously, the main 
inefficiency concern in governmental takings is that authorities may 
fall prey to a “fiscal illusion,” where they exercise their coercive 
takings power without accounting for the value of the property.59  
Proceedings involving landowners, especially ones in which owners 
have the right to present claims that include property values before 
the authority itself, significantly mitigate the concern that the 
authorities will ignore or overlook this value.60  When conceptualized 
this way, the procedural safeguard offers protection against all three 
concerns inherent in takings law — most directly against government 
abuse, and secondarily against unfair or inefficient processes. 
A similar argument can be made about the fairness safeguard, 
which protects principally against the risk of inequity in coercive 
takings.61  The primary concern is that the government might exercise 
its duty to provide for society’s needs in an unbalanced manner.  This 
improperly places societal burdens disproportionately on the 
shoulders of private property owners.  The public use requirement 
protects against this possibility because it clarifies the boundaries of 
the sacrifice demanded from individual citizens.62  But a more in-
depth examination reveals that this requirement also provides 
protection against governmental corruption and economic 
 
 58. Hudson, supra note 26, at 1287. 
 59. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 60. Shai Stern, Remodeling Just Compensation: Applying Restorative Justice to 
Takings Law Doctrine, 30 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 413, 440 (2017). 
 61. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 62. Id. 
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inefficiency.  The requirement that government takings be used only 
for public needs mitigates the possibility of abuse of power by limiting 
the purposes for which government can properly expropriate private 
property.  The “publicness” requirement also addresses the concern 
of inefficiency in governmental takings, because the government 
justifies its power to take private property by latching onto a market 
failure — without government intervention, the reasoning goes, the 
public need will not be met.63  But in cases where the aimed project 
involves private commodities rather than public ones, there is no 
economic justification for the government to exercise its compulsory 
takings power.  Like the procedural safeguard, ensuring fairness in 
takings protects principally against inequitable distribution of 
burdens, but also provides secondary guarantees against corruption 
and inefficiency. 
Finally, the efficiency safeguard is primarily intended to ensure the 
economic efficiency of the governmental expropriation by requiring 
just compensation for compulsory taking.  But this safeguard also 
reduces the risks of governmental corruption and unfairness.  The 
requirement that owners receive compensation for taken property 
reduces the likelihood of governmental corruption because it attaches 
a price tag to the taking.  If the taking authority is exempt from 
granting compensation to the owners, it has an incentive to take 
private property — governmental gain at no cost.  This perverse 
incentive might motivate authorities to take private property even 
when the taking does not provide for society’s needs, and instead only 
feeds the interests of those close to power.  Attaching a cost to 
governmental takings reduces authorities’ incentive to exploit their 
power for improper purposes, since they will have to pay owners for 
the taken property.64  The compensation requirement also reduces 
unfairness in the governmental takings process, mainly with respect to 
the concern that an unbalanced burden will be imposed on property 
owners’ shoulders for the benefit of society at large.  The 
compensation requirement accounts for at least part of the property’s 
worth.65  In this sense, compensation acts as a counterweight to the 
loss incurred by owners, thereby reducing the concern that they will 
 
 63. See Garnett, supra note 2, at 139. 
 64. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings 
Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2010) (“Mandatory compensation 
dramatically reduces the profits politicians can derive from takings.  As a result, it 
takes away much of the incentive to use the takings power to private ends and 
refocuses their attention on the public good.”). 
 65. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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have to bear the entire burden of providing for society’s needs.  
Demanding just compensation thus not only ensures efficient takings 
procedures, but also acts to dissuade corrupt government practices 
and to provide some fairness into an otherwise unfair transaction. 
The safeguards thus operate through an interplay: in “perfect” 
conditions, each safeguard provides protection against all three risks 
inherent in governmental expropriation of private property, primarily 
against one and partially against the other two.  This interplay is 
particularly important for “imperfect” circumstances, when the 
government is justified in reducing the implementation of one of the 
safeguards because all three safeguards overlap in protections.  As 
implementation of one safeguard is lowered, the concern that 
safeguard is primarily intended to alleviate can still be addressed by 
heightening implementation of the other two safeguards.  This 
broadens the circumstances in which government can properly 
exercise its eminent domain powers.  Even in imperfect circumstances 
when one of the protective mechanisms must be partially weakened, 
takings can remain legitimate as long as the other two protective 
mechanisms are fully implemented. 
Think, for example, of a situation in which the state is required to 
expropriate private property in response to an urgent security 
threat.66  In such a situation, it is difficult to follow regulated and 
transparent procedures, and trying to do so might endanger the public 
by hindering the government’s taking.  Can property owners be 
satisfied with the existence of only the other two safeguards — public 
need (fairness) and compensation (efficiency) — in order to validate 
the expropriation?  Or, consider a scenario in which the authority’s 
financial situation does not enable it to purchase property needed to 
fulfill an essential societal need at full market price.  Does the 
government’s poverty negate the taking’s legitimacy?  Finally, 
imagine a situation in which the government seeks to advance a goal 
with the help of private entities, or one where the purpose for which 
the government seeks to expropriate property is achievable only 
when private entities profit financially from the governmental taking.  
Would involvement of such private parties (and possibly their 
profiting from the taking) undercut the taking’s legitimacy? 
These scenarios are not hypothetical.  They have occurred in a 
considerable number of governmental takings executed in the United 
 
 66. See Brian A. Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 398 (2015) 
(reviewing cases of emergency takings for security reasons). 
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States and around the world.67  This Article, therefore, calls for 
rejecting the rigid, unrealistic framework of implementing all 
protections against compulsory government takings and 
acknowledges that the interplay among the three safeguards remedies 
the flaws that arise when any one of them is suppressed.  This 
acknowledgment depends upon two necessary conditions: first, that 
all three safeguards remain in effect, however partially; second, that 
lowering the bar for the implementation of one of the safeguards 
demands stricter adherence to the other two safeguards. 
The first condition suggests that none of the safeguards can be 
quashed entirely because each safeguard protects directly against one 
of the concerns inherent in government’s power to take private 
property.  As the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Chevron: “If 
a government action is found to be impermissible — for instance 
because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary 
as to violate due process — that is the end of the inquiry.  No amount 
of compensation can authorize such action.”68 
The second condition recognizes the interplay amongst the 
safeguards, as well as the cumulative protection they provide against 
the three inherent concerns.  This interplay provides a platform to 
address imperfect circumstances in which governments aim to provide 
for society’s needs but lack time or funding.  The application of the 
interplay model to imperfect circumstances is characteristic of many 
expropriations in the United States and worldwide and justifies 
governments’ use of takings power despite one of the aforementioned 
deficiencies.  The interplay model also permits us to rethink some old, 
outdated conventions that shaped current takings law. 
IV. RETHINKING OLD CONVENTIONS 
The interplay model proposed in this Article aims to provide a 
normative justification for imperfect takings, when authorities must 
execute their takings power despite only partially employing one of 
the three safeguards.  This reimagining of compulsory government 
takings provides an explanation of, and a justification for, 
governmental takings that seem at odds with current takings law, as 
 
 67. Id. at 397–401. See also Carol L. Zeiner, Establishing a Leasehold Through 
Eminent Domain: A Slippery Slope Made More Treacherous by Kelo, 56 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 503, 523 (2007) (discussing governments’ need to compromise process to 
address disasters); Hudson, supra note 26, at 1310. 
 68. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). 
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well as an opportunity to rethink old conventions in takings 
jurisprudence. 
A. Kelo Reconstructed: Compromising Public Use 
Much has been written about the ongoing dismantling of the 
“publicness” standard required by the “public use” of takings, and on 
the compromising treatment that courts give to expropriation of 
private property for purposes that are not truly public.69  The most 
prominent example of this is found in Kelo.70  There, the Supreme 
Court found that the “economic development” planned by the City of 
New London was a legitimate public use; that is, it was a project that 
met the constitutional requirement that takings ought not be carried 
out unless for public use.71  In Kelo, New London confiscated private 
property owned by Suzette Kelo and her neighbors in order to 
establish a research facility for the pharmaceutical company Pfizer.72  
The private status of the entity expected to use the taken property 
was not debated; rather, the City argued that the large research center 
would create new jobs, increase tax and other city revenues, and 
revitalize a depressed urban area.73  These benefits to the city and its 
residents, the City maintained, satisfied the public use requirement.  
Kelo and her neighbors protested that these marginal benefits to 
society could not disguise the fact that the City took private property 
from a group of private owners and gave it to a private company.74  
The Supreme Court sided with New London.  In a 5-4 decision, the 
Court held that the general benefits a community might enjoy from 
economic growth qualify private redevelopment plans as a 
permissible “public use” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.75 
Scholars and jurists regard Kelo as a challenge to the public use 
requirement.  Some have argued that legitimizing expropriations of 
private property for economic development will inevitably harm 
 
 69. See, e.g., Philip Nichols Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent 
Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615 (1940); Lawrence Burger, Public Use Requirement in 
Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1977); Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent 
Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931 (2007); Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934 
(2003). 
 70. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 71. Id. at 489–90. 
 72. Id. at 473–75. 
 73. Id. at 472. 
 74. Id. at 477–78. 
 75. Id. at 489–90. 
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vulnerable private property owners, because it provides another 
excuse for authorities to expropriate property in blighted 
neighborhoods.76  Various states across the United States amended 
their expropriation laws in response to the Court’s rulings in Kelo, 
mostly by increasing the amount of compensation that private 
property owners would be entitled to in the event of government 
taking for purposes of economic development.77  But is the public and 
legal backlash against Kelo justified?  Was the Kelo Court right to 
legitimize the taking? 
To answer this question, we must return to the essence of the 
public use requirement: to provide a method for government to fairly 
provide for societal needs.78  This was incorporated into the Takings 
Clause primarily to mark the boundaries of fairness when government 
exercises coercive power to take private property.79  The inclusion of 
constitutional safeguards demonstrates that using coercive taking to 
redistribute property between two private individuals is 
inappropriate,80 but its use to satisfy the needs of society as a whole 
might be acceptable.  To determine whether a compulsory taking 
complies with the public use requirement, one needs to check 
whether it fulfills a societal need that the government is expected to 
provide. 
The Court had two options in Kelo: it could define “public use” as 
including only those essential social needs that will directly serve the 
public as a whole, or it could recognize “public use” more broadly to 
include projects that provide either essential or marginal societal 
benefits.  The former of these interpretations relies on a binary 
conception of public use, one in which any public project can be 
 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Allowing the government to 
take property solely for a public purpose is bad enough, but extending the concept of 
public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these 
losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not 
only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but 
are also the least politically powerful.  If ever there were justification for intrusive 
judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect ‘discreet and insular 
minorities,’ surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups 
and individuals the Public Use Clause protects.”); see also Charles E. Cohen, 
Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning 
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 546 (2006); 
Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 
URB. LAW. 201, 205–06 (2006). 
 77. As mentioned, several states changed their expropriation laws in reaction to 
Kelo. See supra note 56. 
 78. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). 
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characterized as only one of two alternatives — it is either for an 
essential “public use,” or it is not.  The latter, in contrast, recognizes a 
linear approach — a continuum that stretches between the most 
essential public uses on one end, to the projects whose contribution to 
the public is marginal on the other.  Services on the essential end 
include security, safety, public health, education, and transportation; 
on the marginal end are projects that give expropriated property to 
private entities, and the public enjoys the secondary benefits of these 
private investments.  In a series of rulings, the Court rejected the 
binary conception and chose to apply the linear one.81  Justice 
Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Kelo, describes the Court’s 
choice of the linear approach as “the latest in a string of our cases 
construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the 
slightest nod to its original meaning.”82  According to Justice Thomas, 
therefore, the Court’s choosing to apply the linear approach to public 
use coincides with nullifying the public use requirement altogether. 
The interplay model proposed in this Article offers a different 
perspective on the Court’s adoption of the linear approach, which 
results in a more sympathetic conceptualization of the Kelo ruling.  
Under the interplay model, the Court’s decision to apply the linear 
approach does not mean that the distinctions between different levels 
of “publicness” in various projects must be rejected.  On the contrary, 
adopting the linear approach sharpens the distinction between 
projects with a high level of publicness, such that their 
implementation is essential to the public as a whole, and projects that 
contribute primarily to private entities and provide only marginal 
benefits to the public.  It would be incorrect to view the Court’s ruling 
in Kelo as stating that projects with only marginal public benefit are 
no different from those directly supplying vital public needs.  The 
correct interpretation of the Court’s legitimizing marginal benefit 
projects as “public use” is that there is a degree of publicness to each 
project, which varies depending on particular instances and 
conditions.  The interplay model functions in precisely this manner: as 
long as the government project falls somewhere on the continuum, 
such that the government can point to a public benefit that would 
result from implementing the project, it is acceptable to compromise 
on the extent of the project’s publicness as long as the government 
ensures strict implementation of the other two safeguards.  Indeed, to 
 
 81. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. 
 82. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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the extent that the other two safeguards — in this case the procedural 
and efficiency safeguards — will be performed with heightened 
urgency, we might legitimize governmental taking of private property 
even if the project for which the property is taken compromises the 
public use requirement. 
To illustrate the interplay model, let us reconsider Kelo.  The 
Court compromised the public use requirement in government 
takings when it determined that “economic development” of a 
blighted area by a private entity constituted a legitimate public use.83  
Certainly, this is not equivalent to circumstances in which land is 
expropriated for essential public needs.  At the same time, it is worth 
recognizing that the project for which the land was expropriated in 
Kelo still retained a degree of publicness, however limited.  The 
public benefits of establishing a research and development center in 
New London were an improvement, for example, on the poor 
employment conditions in the city.  Therefore, while economic 
development was not primarily a public use in the strict 
understanding of the term, it nevertheless remained on the continuum 
such that the public use requirement was not fully compromised. 
According to the interplay model, compromising on one of the 
three safeguards does not coincide with denying the legitimacy of the 
expropriation altogether.  Rather, this compromise heightens a 
government’s duty to ensure the implementation of the other two 
safeguards.  In the case of Suzette Kelo, then, the proper question to 
ask is whether fair procedure and proper compensation were strictly 
met.  In his book Little Pink House, Jeff Benedict follows Suzette 
Kelo’s journey, from her purchasing the house that was eventually 
taken by New London, to her travels across the United States after 
the Supreme Court’s decision.84  Benedict reveals the long process 
New London required to execute the taking, which included 
negotiations, hearings, and notifications.85  Although neither these 
procedures nor their outcomes satisfied Suzette Kelo and her 
neighbors, it should be recognized that they fulfilled New London’s 
due process requirements. 
 
 83. Id. at 479. 
 84. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF 
DEFIANCE AND COURAGE (2009). 
 85. To get a sense of the level of owners’ involvement in the process, see 
BENEDICT, supra note 84, at 140 (“Anger filled the room when members gathered to 
discuss the city council’s vote. They had done research, circulated petitions, organized 
letter-writing campaigns, garnered positive publicity, mobilized citizens, attended 
public hearings, and demonstrated strong opposition to the NLDC’s plan. They had 
even produced an alternative plan.  Nothing had worked . . . .”). 
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The Supreme Court also highlighted the municipality’s compliance 
with due process.86  After reviewing how New London executed its 
takings power, Justice Kennedy wrote in concurrence: “The city 
complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate 
review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.”87  As for 
the compensation requirement, at no point in Kelo’s long legal 
journey did she argue that the compensation was flawed, or that she 
and her neighbors were not offered the fair market value of their 
property.  For purposes of this Article, therefore, let us assume that 
the compensation requirement was fully satisfied. 
Evaluating Suzette Kelo’s case through the interplay model, it is 
evident that the procedural and fairness safeguards met the requisite 
high bar that resulted from weakening the public use safeguard.  An 
examination of the Court’s ruling in Kelo reveals that the Court 
considered and implemented — even if unintentionally — the 
interplay model proposed in this Article.  The reason that the Court 
approved New London’s taking, even though the public use 
requirement was set at a relatively low threshold, was the 
expropriation’s fulfillment of the other two requirements of the 
interplay model.  Public use, though compromised, was not 
eviscerated, and the other two safeguards were employed 
scrupulously. 
B. Emerging Takings: Compromising Procedures 
The Constitution binds the government’s power to take private 
property with the duty to provide due process to owners.88  Initially, 
courts varied in how they applied procedural due process 
requirements to government interference with private property.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. James Daniel Good 
Real Property resolved this variance, cementing the constitutional 
basis for applying due process rights to government takings 
proceedings.89 
In Good Real Property, the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
requires the government to afford owners notice and opportunity to 
 
 86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493. 
 87. Id. at 493. 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”). 
 89. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993). 
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be heard before seizing their property in a civil forfeiture case.90  The 
police found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Good’s home, and he 
pleaded guilty to criminal charges.91  Almost four-and-a-half years 
later, the government seized Good’s property without prior notice or 
an adversarial proceeding.92  Good asserted that he was deprived of 
his property without due process of law and that the forfeiture action 
was invalid because it had not been timely commenced.93  The 
Supreme Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees that every property owner must receive 
notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government 
deprives him or her of property.94 
Though the case did not deal directly with the government’s power 
to confiscate private property for public use, the Court’s conclusion 
about the essence of Fifth Amendment due process provided solid 
ground for recognizing due process rights in eminent domain 
proceedings.95  The Court’s discussion of the role that procedural 
requirements play in preventing governmental abuse of takings power 
was clear.  The purpose of the right to prior notice and hearing, 
Justice Kennedy wrote, “is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the 
individual.  Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and 
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize 
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property . . . .”96  
Good Real Property thus dispelled any uncertainty surrounding the 
government’s duty to provide due process to property owners in 
expropriation proceedings.  The government is obligated to notify 
owners of its intentions and to involve them in the takings process, all 
to reduce the concern that the government will abuse its power.97  
This clear doctrine in mind begs the question: Can the government 
legitimately compromise on its duty to provide owners with due 
process in imperfect circumstances?  Can an owner be deprived of his 
due process rights — prior notice and hearing — in a case of 
emergency? 
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 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 47. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 48. 
 95. Hudson, supra note 26, at 1302. 
 96. Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–
81 (1972)). 
 97. Id. at 62; see also Hudson, supra note 26, at 1287. 
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The Good Real Property Court provided an answer to this 
question, suggesting that the general rule that mandates prior notice 
and hearing might tolerate some exceptions.98  But these exceptions, 
which should only be recognized in “extraordinary situations where 
some valid governmental interest is at stake,”99 do not completely 
excuse the government from its procedural obligations.  Rather, they 
ease implementation of procedural obligations by allowing the 
government to postpone the hearing until after the taking is 
executed.100  The Good Real Property Court enforced procedural due 
process as a barrier to governmental abuse of power while 
simultaneously recognizing that imperfect situations may require 
some lessening of — though not entirely eliminating — this duty. 
This conclusion reflects the interplay model, which allows for only 
partial realization of the procedural safeguard in order to 
accommodate imperfect circumstances.101  But the interplay model 
advances a second condition: it is not enough to ensure that no 
safeguard is entirely eliminated; the government must also raise the 
bar for implementation of the other two safeguards.  In other words, 
if the government is to legitimize its failure to fully meet procedural 
obligations, the taking should be for a vital public use and the owners 
must be adequately compensated. 
A careful reading of Good Real Property shows that the decision 
complies with this second condition as well.  In recognizing that there 
might be circumstances that justify an exception to government’s duty 
to provide due process in expropriation, Justice Kennedy embraced 
criteria proposed in another Supreme Court ruling, 
Mathews v. Eldridge.102  In Mathews, the Court addressed whether 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a 
recipient of Social Security disability benefits be afforded an 
opportunity for a hearing prior to termination of those benefits.103  
The Mathews Court suggested that determining whether Fifth 
Amendment due process requirements had been met in a particular 
case cannot be done “technically” — that is, without considering time, 
place, and circumstances.104  Instead, the Court offered three criteria 
to determine whether the burdens of due process were met in any 
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given case: “the private interest affected by the official action; the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures 
used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the 
Government’s interest, including the administrative burden that 
additional procedural requirements would impose.”105  The Mathews 
analysis, adopted by the Good Real Property Court, supports the 
connection between the three safeguards that make up the interplay 
model: when the bar on one safeguard is lowered, it must be raised 
for the other two. 
According to the Mathews analysis, mitigating government’s 
procedural obligations should align with the government’s interest in 
executing the taking.  In other words, the greater the interest of the 
government — or the public — in executing the taking, the greater 
the willingness to ease the procedural protections.  This suggests that 
the procedural requirements imposed on the government might be 
mitigated only for the most essential public uses.  The logic behind 
this conclusion is self-evident: if the government is pressed to provide 
some public good, and so seeks to weaken the procedural protections 
it owes to property holders, the taking must be for the most essential 
and urgent public needs.  The government should not be able to ease 
its procedural obligations to take property for noncritical purposes, 
even if these projects would eventually benefit the public. 
The Mathews analysis also impliedly supports the proposition that 
mitigating government’s procedural obligations should be 
conditioned on raising the bar for the efficiency safeguard.  While 
neither Mathews nor Good Real Property were dealing directly with 
takings of real property — and, therefore, do not deal with 
compensation to owners — they nonetheless relate to the link 
between compromising government’s procedural obligations and 
ensuring efficiency and aggregate welfare.106  The Mathews analysis 
specifically requires the government to consider the deprived private 
interest, the costs of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of the 
safeguards, and the administrative costs of the action.107  These 
considerations aim to achieve the same goal as the compensation 
requirement in takings law — to ensure that the governmental action 
will internalize the social costs involved.  As both Mathews and Good 
Real Property indicate, mitigating government’s procedural 
obligations requires a strict examination of the impact this would 
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have on the overall efficiency of the action.  This is reflected in the 
interplay model: if the government mitigates its procedural 
obligations it must simultaneously ensure strict implementation of the 
efficiency safeguard.  Thus, the Mathews analysis, adopted by the 
Good Real Property Court, aligns with the interplay model’s second 
condition — compromising the procedural safeguard requires raising 
the bar for the implementation of both the fairness safeguard (i.e. 
only essential public uses) and the efficiency safeguard (i.e. full 
compensation). 
C. Budgetary Constraints: Compromising Compensation 
Another convention that the interplay model urges us to rethink is 
that government takings ought to be executed only in exchange for 
fair market value compensation.  The “just compensation” clause of 
the Fifth Amendment was interpreted by courts as a duty imposed on 
the appropriating authorities to provide owners with the fair market 
value of the taken property.108  The courts established fair market 
value as the universal standard for just compensation, which is now a 
prerequisite to legitimate property confiscation.109 
But what if the government cannot pay owners the fair market 
value of their property?  The most prominent example of such a 
situation is in emergencies — imperfect circumstances.  Consider, for 
example, a serious disaster that requires the local government to 
perform some large-scale activities.  Among other things, the local 
government is required to expropriate land or demolish structures on 
private property to cope with the disaster and its consequences.  The 
costs of dealing with such a disaster likely exceed the financial 
capacity of governments, particularly small, local governments.  But 
the importance of rapid and effective assistance from the authorities 
in emergency events is clear.  Faced with this impossible situation, 
how must the government act?  Should it expropriate private 
property even though it cannot pay the fair market value to the 
owners, or should it limit its relief and refrain from undertaking 
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activities that exceed its budget?  And, if we allow government to 
take property in order to provide services to the public regardless of 
its financial capability, should this be limited only to emergencies? 
Current takings jurisprudence distinguishes between cases of 
emergency in which the government decides to confiscate private 
property and circumstances where the government chooses to destroy 
property to thwart a grave threat.110  When the government 
confiscates property, it is obligated to compensate the owner with an 
amount equal to the fair market value of the property.111  But when 
the government destroys the property, the owner is not entitled to 
compensation.112  This destruction exception, which denies property 
owners’ right to compensation, is embedded in the law as the 
“necessity” exemption or the “non-compensation principle.”113  This 
principle has faced criticism, mainly because it leaves property owners 
uncompensated even though their property was destroyed.114  The 
importance of this principle, however, only becomes more acute as 
governments around the world are forced to deal with severe weather 
or control the spread of diseases that endanger public health and law 
enforcement.115  These extreme scenarios can be thought of as 
imperfect, emergency cases that justify denying compensation to the 
landowner when the authorities destroy their property. 
The application of the non-compensation principle to emergency 
situations has garnered much criticism from commentators,116 but 
aiming to identify its underlying justification reveals important 
implications in takings law.  Examining the history of the non-
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compensation principle in American law, Brian Lee suggests that the 
principle provides governments with an exemption from paying 
compensation in emergencies not only because of administrative 
difficulties, but also because they lack the resources required to pay 
full compensation to owners.117  Lee further argues that the non-
compensation principle does not require the adoption of an “all or 
nothing” compensation policy; rather, it allows partial compensation, 
subject to the government’s fiscal capabilities.118 
The recognition that a government’s budgetary limitations can 
justify partial or no compensation ought to apply beyond the 
boundaries of property destruction to thwart a threat.  Indeed, it is 
sensible to apply this justification even in cases where the government 
is required to expropriate property, rather than destroy it, for public 
needs.  Consider, for example, a local authority that is required to 
provide its residents with sidewalks, roads, educational institutions, 
medical institutions, and workplaces.  It will be relatively easy for an 
affluent local authority that has sufficient economic means to provide 
these needs: the lands required to provide sidewalks or roads will be 
expropriated from private owners and, in return, the authority will 
pay the landowners the full market value of the taken property.  But 
this is not the case for poorer, struggling local governments that, due 
to budgetary constraints, cannot pay the full market value in 
exchange for property, and thus might not be able to supply essential 
public goods.  In such circumstances, strict compliance to full 
compensation that matches the market value will undoubtedly impair 
the ability of poor local authorities to support the vital needs of 
residents.  Denying poorer municipalities the flexibility to expropriate 
property with only partial compensation, such that they can overcome 
their budgetary limitations, does not contradict the essence of the 
takings power.119  As stated, the power to expropriate property is 
intended to enable authorities to overcome structural failures so they 
may provide for the essential needs of society.120  Ignoring budgetary 
limitations of local authorities, therefore, leaves them hollow, with 
empty power, while their residents remain without necessary services.  
While this concern is relevant to any authority that is struggling with 
significant budgetary limitations, it increases in cases of emergency, 
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when even economically well-established authorities may find 
themselves struggling due to the amount of public assistance they 
have to provide. 
The interplay model proposed in this Article seeks to address 
precisely these imperfect situations.  Government’s power to take 
private property is primarily intended to enable it to overcome 
failures that would otherwise prevent it from providing for its 
constituency’s most vital needs.  The interplay model can address and 
justify complex situations in which authorities are forced to pay 
property owners only partial compensation that amounts to less than 
the fair market value of the property.  Compromising on fair market 
value, however, raises concerns about the efficiency of the taking.121  
Recall that the compensation requirement primarily aims to 
safeguard against inefficient takings, which mostly result from 
authorities’ lack of internalization of all social costs.122  However, the 
interplay model mitigates the concern that authorities will abuse 
budgetary limitations as an excuse to take private property at prices 
lower than the market value.  This is because of the two fundamental 
conditions that underpin the interplay model: that all three safeguards 
remain at least partially in effect, and that lowering the bar for one of 
the safeguards demands strict adherence to the requirements of the 
other two. 
Applying these conditions to circumstances when governments 
struggle with budgetary limitations, but still have to expropriate 
property to provide social needs, reveals that partial-compensation 
takings may still be properly executed.  This is the case when the 
taking is only for the most essential societal purposes, in which the 
public need is clearly defined, and with full respect for the procedural 
rights of landowners.  The interplay model allows authorities 
struggling with budgetary limitations, which might risk their ability to 
provide citizens with essential needs, to overcome one of current 
takings law’s paradoxes.  It allows for a rethinking of the reasons 
underlying government’s takings power in the first place — that is, 
the desire to allow the government to satisfy the needs of society. 
CONCLUSION 
Imperfect circumstances such as emergencies, crises, and budgetary 
limitations threaten government’s ability to use its takings power to 
provide for citizens’ needs.  Strict adherence to takings law’s 
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incorporated safeguards — due process, the public use requirement, 
and compensation — may deprive the government of the ability to 
properly provide these public needs, precisely in times of crisis, when 
these needs are particularly important or threatened.  This Article 
proposes a model that highlights the interplay between all three of 
takings law’s inherent safeguards.  This interplay model maintains 
and provides a normative justification for compromise, when 
circumstances require, on one of the safeguards.  Such a compromise, 
when implemented according to the interplay model’s two conditions, 
allows governments to provide the public its vital needs even in 
imperfect circumstances.  It also provides an explanation of current 
eminent domain jurisprudence that seemingly stands at odds with 
takings law and allows for a rethinking of old conventions. 
